





The articles in this special issue were inspired by the work of Anthony G. (A. G.) 
Hopkins and developed during two workshops sponsored by Western Sydney University 
and coordinated by Brett Bennett in 2013 and 2014. The published contributions all focus 
on a major methodological question in global history: How do historians create or 
employ generalizations—abstractions created by inducing from particular instances—in 
the writing of histories that are global in method or scale? There has been significant 
debate in history, some of it explicit but more of it implicit, about the value and 
limitations of generalizations. Historians rely on them to adduce particular instances into 
larger patterns that seek to explain causality, trace trans-temporal trends, and to make 
comparisons between different places.  
This introductory article assesses three approaches to using generalizations in 
global history. We advocate an approach that allows historians to develop a global history 
methodology that is theoretically and empirically robust, open to engagement with other 
fields, and flexible in the face of new societal demands from historians. The following 
article by Anthony Hopkins offers an historical chronology for analysing the process of 
globalization during the early modern, modern, and postcolonial periods that is informed 
by his forthcoming book on the global history of America and his earlier publications on 
globalization and global history.1 Research articles by Sarah Irving, Timothy Rowse, 
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Gregory Barton, and Brett Bennett explore how the process of globalization influenced 
how people in the past conceived of and created notions of human and natural diversity.  
We suggest there are three main approaches to using generalizations in global 
history: 1) a neo-materialistic approach that allows for the development and testing of 
limited generalizations within history; 2) a deep-history approach that engages with 
broader generalizations within and outside of history; and 3) a culturally informed 
approach with a very limited role for generalizations within and most especially outside 
of history. We argue for a pluralist approach that combines insights from all three views, 
but we do warn about the slippery slope of deconstruction implied by the third.  
Historians who might be said to use a neo-material approach because they often 
incorporate an economic analysis alongside the study of social, political, and cultural 
factors founded the subfield of global history in the 2000s. Many of the key debates have 
revolved around understanding patterns of global development. The debate over the 
“Great Divergence” between Europe and Asia, for instance, is characteristic of the types 
of issues that incorporate economic history into a wider framework of analysis. Global 
historians in this mould tend to test historical generalizations against case studies that are 
based on qualitative and quantitative data. Many, but by no means all, scholars use 
methods of “reciprocal comparison” and “institutional equivalence” that allow for 
comparisons to be made between different places, such as Europe and China.2 Scholars 
within this group have had some engagement with the social sciences (less so with the 
sciences), but they tend to be wary of directly importing universal generalizations from 
the sciences or social sciences. For instance, historians of globalization might find 
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inspiration in economic theory, but they rarely import models, such as neoclassical 
economic assumptions about rational choice theory, directly into history.  
Hopkins’ article in this issue might be said to makes a new contribution to this 
literature. He argues “globalization is a process, not a theory, though it sprouts many 
often conflicting theories about its causes and consequences.” There is widespread 
agreement that globalization created more exchange and interaction, but uncertainty 
about how to measure or explain it. He focuses on one central issue, that of “whether the 
history of globalization is the record of a process that has grown larger with the passage 
of time without fundamentally changing its character, or whether it is viewed more 
accurately as the evolution of different types in successive sequences.” Taking the latter 
position, Hopkins offers a schematic chronology of the different phases of globalization 
into early modern, modern, and postcolonial phases. He identifies key “agents” of 
globalization during each phase—such as European empires during the early modern and 
modern phase or supranational corporations and international governance during the 
postcolonial era. Hopkins’ view epitomizes the best scholarship in this arena of global 
history by creating precise, measurable definitions based on case studies that can be 
tested by historians throughout the world.  
There is a growing number of historians advocating even bigger, trans-temporal 
histories such as deep history or big history that widen the remit of global history. These 
historians want the history profession to engage more with interdisciplinary research and 
to have stronger public impact. Jo Guldi and David Armitage strongly advocate for this 
point in their widely discussed and debated The History Manifesto.3 They argue that the 
history profession became increasingly insular in the 1980s and 1990s because of the 
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embrace of deconstructionist, short-term, and micro-scale studies that undermined the 
long-standing view that historians can and should observe long-term patterns. They 
advocate widening the remit of historians to allow us to engage with trans-temporal 
patterns and issues: “[history] has an important role to play in developing standards, 
techniques, and theories suited to the analysis of mutually incompatible datasets where a 
temporal element is crucial to making sense of causation and correlation.”4 This view is a 
somewhat slimmer version of big history, an approach pioneered by David Christian that 
allows historians to use universal generalizations drawing on scientific theories, such as 
evolution, and temporal scales going back millions or billions of years.5  
These two positions are distinctly at odds with postcolonial or deconstructivist 
approaches to global history that contest efforts by historians to trace long-term patterns, 
to attribute causality, or to make comparisons that are not based on direct connections. 
This approach denies the use of large-scale generalizations in history, and is even more 
dismissive of theories drawn from the social sciences and sciences. These views build on 
earlier thinking developed during the cultural, linguistic, and post-structuralism turns in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Lynn Hunt, one of the leaders of the cultural turn who has recently 
shifted to global history, warns in her 2012 book on global history that “the globalization 
paradigm reinstates the very suppositions that cultural theories had criticized, and thus 
potentially threatens to wash away the gains of the last decades of cultural history.”6 
Leading postcolonial historians encourage a type of global contingency without cause or 
origin because this takes attention away from Europe as part of efforts to “provincialize 
Europe.” As a result, many decentred and postcolonial network approaches encourage 
scholars not to look for “putative origins” but rather to trace interactions between points 
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in a network, a distinctly Foucaultian view of power relations.7 The prominent German 
global historian Sebastian Conrad calls on historians to downplay or reject “origins, 
either geographically or temporally” because they often point to Europe.8 Conrad notes 
that the reason for this view is that “many are cautious to avoid sweeping generalizations 
and master narratives that culminate in the modern West, wary of a rhetoric of the 
“global” that they read as an imperialist discourse of domination.”9  
It is healthy that there are so many different approaches in global history. We seek 
to encourage a liberality of approaches to generalizations in global history, with the 
caveat that we should be open to all approaches so long as an approach does not advocate 
a historical exclusivity that entirely denies the ability to offer other perspectives. 
Historians should encourage rigorous testing of all generalizations rather than warning 
people away from employing certain types of generalization. If we take post-
structuralism and the linguistic turn seriously, then all knowledge, no matter how limited, 
is to some degree socially constructed. A key premise of post-structural histories of 
knowledge is that “facts,” no matter how small or simple, are complex generalizations 
involving a significant amount of tacit social knowledge. Deconstructivist approaches are 
useful as part of a bigger toolkit of methods that we use to question past and present 
meanings; but deconstruction is not itself a coherent approach to history because it 
ultimately denies historians the ability to reconstruct meaningful patterns. Even if 
patterns are merely constructs of our own minds, that still does not deny their usefulness 
in our lives. If, as the postmoderns say, all history is biased, and we write history for 
ourselves, then let us take that to heart and write histories that people find useful and 
meaningful. 
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While we should all support inclusivity and plurality, it is nonetheless worthwhile 
to warn about the potential dangers of deconstructivist approaches in global history 
(much as scholars in this tradition warn against anything that smacks of Eurocentrism). 
These views, if followed to their logical conclusion, would spell the end of materialist 
and bigger approaches to global history that allow us to make bridges outside the 
discipline and academy. Historians should be wary of sliding down the same slippery 
slope that led cultural historians in the 1980s to reject generalizations and downplay 
causality and materiality. Leading luminaries of post-structuralism and the cultural turn, 
such as Bruno Latour, have written critiques of cultural scholars who, rather than 
employing cultural history as one of many helpful tools to study the past, espoused their 
approach as orthodox creeds.10 Guldi and Armitage, among others, argue that the 
historical embrace of micro-history and deconstruction left the public policy arena open 
to scholars from other disciplines, such as political science, who spoke the language the 
public and elites wanted to hear.  
How can global historians respond to the various pressures of engagement while 
staying faithful to history as a distinct discipline? One pragmatic response could define 
and defend a global history that is internally rigorous but has potential applicability 
outside of the discipline. Using consistent and transparent definitions would build up a 
strong empirical body of knowledge that can be tested. History has and will always have 
subjective elements, but it is possible to make a rigorous methodology based on cross-
referencing and rigorous examination of evidence and generalizations. The outcomes of 
these positions may not be “objective,” but they would function as useable knowledge to 
be tested and applied in other situations. We must be more open to different and opposing 
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ideas. The best way to reduce or account for bias—which always will exist—is to 
advocate a position of historical neutrality that judges arguments based on evidence 
rather than our most up-to-date views or ideologies. For instance, we should also be open 
to challenging currently in-vogue arguments that propose an East-West equivalence, or 
even an Asian superiority to Europe, with the same vigour that Eurocentric explanations 
have been challenged.11 Evidence-based arguments with clear definitions should never be 
challenged by simply saying that history is too “complex” to analyse or to summarize. 
Scholars should propose coherent theories that can be tested throughout different times 
and places to determine their validity and offer new insights. This model allows 
historians to write histories for diverse audiences and to engage with problems inside and 
outside of the discipline of history so that they can remain relevant to society. 
 
Generalizations and Deep History 
We explore one new way of approaching global history and the history of globalization 
that takes generalizations seriously as a historical category of analysis. There has been 
considerable discussion about why historians generalize, and even more written on the 
specific generalizations made by people in the past, say during the Enlightenment. But 
very little has been written about the human tendency to generalize. Are generalizations a 
cultural construct or something rooted deep in our biological makeup? Few scholars ever 
raise this question, as if it is either so obvious as need no response or unanswerable 
therefore not worth asking. There are multiple ways to approach this question. From one 
point of view, generalizations are complex symbols of meaning made possible by the 
unique brain of modern humans (Homo sapiens), which is the product of hominid 
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evolution generally and our species specifically. Yet humans’ generalizations have varied 
considerably across time and space, so this biological link, though important, is at best 
necessary but not sufficient.  
It may be possible to write a deep history of generalizations that takes into 
account long-term and short-term patterns based on various causes and contexts. Deep 
history advocates, such as Daniel Lord Smail, David Christian, and David Armitage, 
among many others, have called for histories that utilize insights from other disciplines 
and tackle longer periods of time. In this method, paleoecological findings, DNA analysis 
of bodies, geology, and climate reconstruction from ice cores are all valuable for 
reconstructing a history of the past. Historians still tend to focus on written records, but 
are incorporating a variety of new sources, from oral history to climate records, into 
histories. We are living in an exciting age of experimentation in history.  
A deep history approach to generalizations could go back hundreds of thousand or 
even millions of years. Generalizations and abstraction are possible because of the 
evolution of human cognitive capacities for language and abstract thought, a process that 
can be traced back 200,000 years to the origins of Homo sapiens and up to a million years 
for earlier hominids. There are various theories for how abstract thought emerged as a 
result of stalking game on trails, through random gene changes, and through the use of 
tools. The past remains shrouded in mystery, so we will never have certainty on these 
theories, but we can continue to develop and test them across a range of times, places, 
and species.  
There are some things that are firmly known because they are rooted in a material 
historical record. Generalization can be traced through the substantial archaeological 
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record of culture that now dates back approximately two million years. The earliest 
human rock art of animals shows a tendency of the human mind to create an abstracted 
depiction of the animals that surrounded them. Abstract thought became progressively 
more important to people once humans underwent the Neolithic Revolution, which saw 
the emergence of cities and agriculture. Early philosophy speculated on the meanings and 
uses of abstraction. Some of the earliest philosophical ideas, most notably Plato’s 
Socratic dialogues, focus on the “heaven of ideas,” a way to describe the tendency of the 
human mind to fixate on abstract, generalized ideas to explain their diverse, lived 
experience. Other philosophies rely on complex abstractions that imbed ideas without 
material life. Indigenous Australians devised complex kinship systems requiring 
considerable abstraction that has long challenged the minds of Europeans. Every society 
has had some form of abstraction, whether they assessed these abstractions through 
formal metaphysics, logic, or other explicit analysis.  
Yet abstractions have changed considerably across time, so we must be wary of 
universalizing ideas and taking them out of context. Historians of science recognize that 
what people may think today about Pythagoras of Samos is not what he believed, or what 
people in any other time believed.12 Still, it is remarkable how certain ideas or thinkers, 
such as Plato and Pythagoras, have had enduring influence because of their emphasis on 
generalities rather than on particulars. That the writing of certain people can become 
“classics” transcending time and space raises important questions about the underlying 
universal basis of humanity. If they exist, trans-temporal patterns require careful tracing 
and contextualizing.  
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Globalizations and Generalization: Creating Ideas of Diversity 
How has globalization shaped human generalizations? Are generalizations of the present 
different from or similar to those of previous times? We suggest that globalization has led 
to the proliferation of new ideas about human and natural diversity that now shape how 
we view the world. The past five hundred years have been fundamentally different from 
any other time in history because of the compression of space and time as a result of 
technologies of mobility and economic and political changes that encouraged 
globalization. Each period of globalization since the 1500s has seen a gradual increase of 
global mobility despite obvious periods where mobility declined during war or recession. 
Globalization has encouraged people to make wider generalizations about the 
environment and people thanks to the increase in human contact, awareness of other parts 
of the world, and greater intensity of interactions. The overwhelming majority of the 
people in the world in the 1700s still lived in small agricultural settlements rather than 
cities or town. Yet the growing importance of long-distance trade, colonial governance, 
and the growing ease of mobility meant that even people who did not leave the village or 
town of their birth were to some degree impacted by global events.  
Initial contact between cultures offers a particularly fruitful area of study for 
identifying how different peoples have responded to difference. A growing body of 
research shows how European imperial expansion initiated ideal conditions for new 
generalizations and abstractions forged from new experiences, peoples, and environments 
in previously unknown parts of the world. Three or more decades ago, most historians 
suggested that Europeans incorporated indigenous peoples into a pre-existing mental 
framework without necessarily fundamentally altering European intellectual 
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development. Atlantic historians have spent the last decade challenging this view by 
showing wider epistemological implications of the meeting of Old and New Worlds. 
Sarah Irving notes that in the field of Atlantic studies, this view has changed drastically in 
the past decade: “Recently, however, some scholars have suggested a very different 
situation, in which the discovery of America produced a kind of shock of the new; a 
sense of wonder which, defying categorization, compelled the reorientation of European 
consciousness.”13 Within the Asian context, Harold Cook’s Matters of Exchange makes a 
similarly compelling argument for how Dutch colonial expansion, and the requirements 
of long-distance trade and governance, led to the importance of precise information, or 
facts, that informed botany, medicine, and even the creation of stock markets.14  
Irving’s paper is part of a larger effort to connect the intellectual histories of the 
Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Ocean worlds together. Her argument is twofold. First, the 
same processes that occurred in the Atlantic world, and have been studied in some detail, 
also occurred in the Pacific world, and should be put into a global context. She examines 
the spread of Scottish-influenced thinkers in the Pacific who applied the Scottish 
Enlightenment idea of “useful knowledge” to understand the new Pacific world they 
encountered in the late eighteenth century. Second, she argues that the intellectual 
changes that occurred based on the experience of mobility must be firmly grounded 
within global history and globalization because Enlightenment ideas informed efforts to 
develop useful knowledge to bolster the strength of the fledgling United States of 
America. This echoes work by A. G. Hopkins, among others, who seek to use the history 
of Anglo settler colonies or the British Empire to illustrate key processes in globalization.  
Thinking in terms of a history of human generalizations and abstraction may help 
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scholars to more historically situate the legacy of rationalism, Enlightenment, and science 
within their proper historical context. There are important differences between the act of 
abstracting or generalizing, the formulation of an idea based on multiple experiences, and 
the specific argument that some generalizations are more correct than others based on 
their supposed inherent rationality or logic. The attack on the Enlightenment and the 
supposed influence of European global expansion is an instance where the process of 
abstracting and the claims of the abstraction have been conflated in a way that limits our 
historical understanding of the period and processes. There are many good philosophical 
and historical reasons to challenge the belief in universal rationality, but by attacking a 
caricature of Enlightenment and scientific Western thought, many cultural scholars create 
an inverse universalist understanding that in turn creates an essentialist idea of Europeans 
and their views of non-European “others.” Ironically, by focusing so intensively on 
essentialist European ideas, scholars who sought to deconstruct the lasting influence of 
these ideas have perhaps given them more influence than they necessarily had at the time. 
Emerging research from the past two decades shows that empire was more of a 
two-way process than has been portrayed by previous “hegemonic” postcolonial 
perspectives. This is not to in any way deny the numerous problems created by 
imperialism and settler colonialism. Yet historians now recognize that the oppression and 
frustration caused by the excesses of colonial governance led in many instances to 
reform. Humanitarians and critics of empire brought many colonial abuses to light. 
Criticism of empire by Europeans and non-Europeans informed ideas of British liberty 
and ushered in the conceptions of universal human rights, a key idea underpinning 
modern democratic societies throughout the world. Enlightenment political and social 
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ideas played an important role in spreading the idea of democratic governance globally. 
The example of the American Revolution and French Revolution provided the basis for 
revolutionary thought and constitution-making globally for non-Europeans in the late 
eighteenth century until the present. The history of human rights developed as a result of 
the material-intellectual engagements caused by the challenges of diversity during 
various phases of globalization.  
Recent studies of colonial governance reaffirm the view that empire and 
globalization should be conceived less as a totalizing, homogenizing process and more as 
a varied series of processes that were shaped with global processes: flows and networks 
linked together different parts of the world that were always mediated by local 
conditions. This perspective is a welcome corrective to the somewhat one-sided view 
advanced in earlier work, such as James Scott’s Seeing Like a State, a book that argues 
that attempts to improve the world through the application of the “science” of governance 
have failed. Scott, along with Theodore Porter’s Trust in Numbers, rightly points to the 
dangers of quantification and calculation in government decision-making. Yet one feels 
sometimes that these views throw the baby out with the bathwater by denying the 
“improvements” of the world that economists and others recognize have led to a global 
increase in living standards, and a seemingly steady decline in societal violence and 
mortality.15 Even criticisms of forestry by Scott and others should be put into context. 
The vast planted conifer forests of Europe he mentions are still in existence over 200 
years later—hardly a total failure.16 Historians have long sought to redress the wrongs of 
the past, a noble task no doubt, but one that often makes history more critical than 
constructive. This is one reason why historians find it hard to reach scholars outside of 
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the humanities and softer social sciences whose disciplines present more neutral to 
positive views on political freedom, economic growth, and human health.  
Tim Rowse’s article in this issue explores how the emergence of statistical 
tabulations of indigenous populations reflected a shift towards humanitarianism in the 
settler colonies in British Australia, New Zealand, and North America. British colonial 
officials initially thought of indigenous groups as “peoples,” something that reflected the 
self-understanding and even sovereignty of groups; but in the 1760s they started to 
conceive of them as “populations” to be governed by imperialists. He explores statistical 
tabulations that highlight this transition through four case studies: Sir William Johnson’s 
tabulation of North American Indians in 1763, Major H. G. Darling’s analysis of 
Canadian Indians in 1828, Walter Mantell’s 1848 description of Maori landowners in 
New Zealand, and Edward Stone Parker’s 1850 tabulation of Aboriginal people in New 
South Wales, Australia. Rowse shows how statistical thinking about people used 
concepts “to equate phenomena, that is, to construct classes of things. These categories 
become ‘social facts’ that actors must take into account in their behaviour . . . [that] ‘hold 
together’ through cognitive effort (data collection and analysis) that informs social 
administration.” Rowse’s article builds on Talal Asad’s thesis that statistics helped 
inform the modernization of peoples by making incommensurable cultures into 
commensurable ones, if only abstractly. In the context of colonial Australia and the 
United States, that statistical knowledge rendered quantifiable difference of humans into 
populations that were knowable and therefore seemingly more manageable.  
The developmental ideology of the colonial state emerged from a similar 
background of abstraction, quantification, and manipulation of nature and society by the 
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state. Enlightenment ideas of improvement gained steady traction from the late eighteenth 
to mid-nineteenth century, when European and European colonial governments first 
started employing professionals with scientific and technical expertise to direct 
“improvement” efforts. The power of experts grew until the mid-twentieth century, a 
period Joseph Hodge calls the “triumph of the expert” within colonial development.17 
The decisions of experts gained greater significance as governments gained more power 
and control over nature and society. Development’s worse follies, such as the Tanganyika 
Groundnut Scheme, reflected the height of the power of experts. At the same time, many 
of the greatest achievements—the Green Revolution, to name one—came directly out of 
the same ethos of development that continued after decolonization through the United 
Nation’s Food and Agricultural Organization, UNESCO, and other intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations.  
A growing body of historical and geographic research points to how scientific 
work took on distinct local traditions based on the people and environments where 
scientists worked. Indigenous knowledge and practices became imbedded within place-
based knowledge that circulated elsewhere. Determining indigenous influences is part of 
the larger social mission of changing conceptions of politics, law, the economy, and the 
environment to account for non-Western ideas and to empower marginalized peoples. 
The category of “the indigenous” has risen to prominence on the back of shifts to civil 
rights, political values, and citizenship in parts of the world that were colonized during 
the past five hundred years. Elsewhere, Rowse has shown how the idea of a common 
“global indigenism” emerged in the early 1990s to represent indigenous peoples.18 Yet 
the desire to uncover indigenous knowledge should not lead historians to either reify or to 
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claim indigenous knowledge where there is little evidence to support the assertion. 
In his article, Gregory Barton argues against what he calls the “myth of the 
peasant” that has been used to explain the origins of organic farming methods in the 
twentieth century. The view that organic farming is steeped in peasant wisdom is in many 
respects a product of marketing and the romanticization of the “ancient” practices of the 
East, itself a type of orientalism. Barton shows how this idea emerged among orientalist 
writers who extolled Chinese and certain Indian methods of recycling humus and human 
waste. He focuses on the scientific experiments and private letters of Albert and Gabrielle 
Howard, two of the most influential thinkers and popularisers of organic farming. Albert 
and Louise read widely and knew about the Chinese and Hunza precedents, but their 
experimental methodology and scientific claims were firmly grounded in empirical 
investigations and the creation of a new framework to explain the importance of organic 
matter in agricultural fertilizing. 
Less research has gone into exploring how understandings of indigenous 
ecosystems and species evolved at the same time as the concept of indigenous peoples 
emerged. In many respects, the lack of research on the indigenous turn in 
environmentalism reflects the longstanding tendency of scientists and many 
environmentalists to see conceptions of nature as being somehow “natural,” when in fact 
they are deeply cultural. Thinking about nature as having “indigenous” characteristics 
and rights led to a fundamental shift in environmental management. During much of the 
age of European imperialism, settlers and officials encouraged a model of “ecological 
liberalism,” that is, mixing of species from around the world to create cosmopolitan, 
utilitarian, and pleasing natures. The shift towards seeing nature as “indigenous” in the 
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1960s and 1970s led to the rise of modern thinking about biodiversity preservation, 
invasive species management, and restoration ecology that guides contemporary 
conservation efforts.  
Brett Bennett’s final article in this volume examines why Australians and South 
Africans of British ancestry started to celebrate and conserve the indigenous vegetation in 
both countries in the 1960s and 1970s. This is part of the longer story of how European 
settlers over time gave greater weight and value to local knowledge, experience and 
situations than to values derived in Europe. Bennett argues that the decolonization, or de-
domionization, of Australia and South Africa in the 1960s led to a significant loss of 
identify and sense of place, which previously was connected to empire and ethnicity. 
South Africa’s decision to leave the Commonwealth in 1962 and Britain’s abandonment 
of the dominions struck a blow to the identity of English speakers in both countries. The 
rise of environmentalism and a new nationalism encouraged people to identify and 
celebrate unique indigenous species of plants found only in their respective countries. 
Australia and South Africa were global pioneers in the development of indigenous and 
native gardens in the 1960s. People in both countries created more public native and 
indigenous gardens the 1960s than probably any other country in the world. There is an 
enduring legacy that can be traced in the gardening practices and conservation zeal of 
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